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Abstract
Response plans developed thoroughly are suggestive
of a successful action, but there is a gap in the literature
with respect to the way concerted efforts among
organizations are planned and change during crises.
Using organizational network data extracted from the
South Korean government’s MERS response manuals,
we examined the changes in the response coordination
network planned during the epidemic’s distinct stages.
The greatest difference in predicting tie formation was
found in the networks planned before the event and
revised during the outbreak. Local and governmental
actors tend to form more ties consistently in the revised
manuals. Two actors that are intended to transfer
medical and/or personnel resources tend to form more
ties across all stages. These findings suggest that
transferring material and/or human resources are key
activities in the epidemic response and planners tend to
increase the connection of local and governmental
actors over time.

1. Introduction
The Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus
(MERS-CoV; MERS) is a global pandemic threat that
attacked Saudi Arabia first in September 2012. As of
May 15, 2019, 2,374 cases were confirmed in the
laboratory and 823 deaths have occurred in 27 countries
[32]. On May 20, 2015, South Korea reported its first
confirmed MERS-CoV case, and the outbreak ended
with 38 deaths, 186 confirmed, and 16,752 suspected
cases [16]. Until now, South Korea remains the country
with the second largest number of confirmed MERSCoV cases after Saudi Arabia [32].
Because MERS-CoV is not transmitted socially, in
that the infection occurs primarily within a closed
environment, such as the hospital, it has been announced
that there is no community-acquired case [32].
Therefore, the widespread outbreak and the high
mortality in the country are attributed primarily to the
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inadequate response and policy failures rather than
biological factors. Follow-up studies generally have
agreed on the ineffectiveness of the response by the
government and the country in general and expressed
concerns about their epidemic response capacity [17]
[18] [7] [19].
The country’s health authorities, for example, Korea
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC)
and the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), had
been aware of the MERS-CoV outbreak since 2012, and
prepared the MERS-CoV specific response manual in
July 2014 [21]. However, the government’s preparation
for the MERS response does not necessarily mean that
stakeholders and the public were aware of such a manual
or ready to implement (or capable of implementing) the
response plans stated in it. Further, the manual was
updated multiple times before and during the outbreak
(eight times by the end of 2015). The response failure is
more troubling given the health authority’s multiple
revisions (i.e., efforts to improve response coordination
by adapting to the evolving situation).
To understand the way the Korean government’s
efforts ended with unwanted outcomes, one must ask
how the efforts to coordinate key stakeholder
organizations were planned as well as implemented [20].
While limited, this study analyzes planned coordination
networks among key stakeholder organizations in the
nine versions of the MERS response manual as the
epidemic progressed. This study contributes to the
emergency management literature by addressing the
lack of empirical studies on the way epidemic response
plans are designed and revised.

2. Emergency response plans
2.1. Emergency planning and written plans
The emergency management literature has noted
distinctions between emergency planning and written
plans. Perry and Lindell differentiated the planning
process from written plans, suggesting that planning is
an on-going process or activity, including plan-making,
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training, and exercises [27]. In contrast, a written plan is
a snapshot of the planning process at a specific time, but
it includes procedural documents, checklists, extended
plans, and principles learned in the planning process.
Written plans are “living documents” embodied in the
planning process that should be revised and changed as
the crisis proceeds.
Plans, in general, are bureaucratic products that
describe formally what society expects of stakeholder
organizations and what organizations expect of
themselves [4] [5]. Brown and Eriksson suggested that
unrealistic plans with a formal expectation alone may
lead directly or indirectly to response failures, and thus,
emergency management plans need to be written in a
more realistic form that reflects the spectrum of threats
and organizational capabilities’ inadequacy [4].
However, lengthy, detailed, and threat-specific plans are
costly (time-consuming and laborious) to maintain
because they require constant revision to avoid the risk
of irrelevance [27]. Previous studies have revealed that
planners’ uniqueness at the individual level (i.e., their
political power, capability, and dedication in making
plans for an emergency [1] [12] [11]), and bureaucratic
realities on the organizational level [4], affect the
development of an ideal emergency response plan.
Nevertheless, response plans are likely to include
two crucial pieces of information, first, which tasks are
prioritized and need to be performed in a given crisis
context. For example, the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC)’s public health
emergency response guide specifies functions and tasks
during different phases [6]. As an example, activities in
the immediate response include assessing the situation;
contacting key health personnel; developing initial
health response objectives; establishing an action plan;
involving public health participation in the emergency
operation center; ensuring that the health and safety plan
is established, reviewed, and followed; establishing
communications with key health and medical
organizations, and so forth. Second, the plans also may
include the way to coordinate or collaborate with other
stakeholder organizations and individuals during the
crisis. However, response plans only are blueprints, in
that they do not, or cannot necessarily specify all
partners or stakeholders in detail [5]. They are more
likely to define only the key actors and their relations in
a general way. These key stakeholders and their
relations constitute the planned response coordination
networks.
Lack of coordination among stakeholders has been
perceived as the greatest weakness and the greatest
source of difficulties in emergency response [10].
Understanding the changes in planned coordination
networks in the domain of emergency management is
particularly important given an emergency response’s

inherently collaborative nature [9]. Because of the
difficulty acquiring appropriate data and inferential
techniques, little research has been conducted on the
network changes in emergency management [28]. In
this paper, we use the response manual dataset Kim, Ku,
and Oh collected and analyzed [20]. However, unlike
Kim and her colleagues, we examine the critical
components of tie formation in the network planned by
examining particular types of actors and activities
during different stages of the epidemic.

2.2. Predicting planned coordination networks
Which actors are intended to play a significant role
and also coordinate most with other actors in epidemic
response plans? In several countries (e.g., U.S., Canada,
and South Korea), a nation’s public health system
addresses public health emergencies [21] [22], which
implies that all levels of government (local, provincial,
and national) are involved in the response. However,
before the outbreak, uncertainty about the likelihood
that a disease will occur in a country is high. Although
not always, infectious diseases can be introduced from
the outside through a human or animal vector. Therefore,
a major effort in response plans is to establish
quarantines in airports and harbors where people enter
from outside the country. Further, suspected cases that
enter the country or are infected within the country are
most likely to visit a local hospital, and the hospital or
local health clinic that the suspected case visits is
required to report the case to the country’s health
authority immediately. This situation demands local
first-response actors, such as local quarantine stations,
health clinics, and hospitals, to coordinate their response
to suspected cases because they are on the frontline in
the fight against the disease. Local actors’ importance
may not change during the outbreak because they
remain the first line of defense in the response and
perform crucial tasks such as surveillance and patient
management.
H1: A local actor is more likely to establish a
connection with other actors than its counterparts at
higher ranks (i.e., national, provincial).
As any emergency tends to cross jurisdictional and
departmental boundaries because of its geographic
scope and broad range of consequences [14] [15] [28],
it is reasonable to assume that the responding actor’s
sector is an important attribute to examine in its
participation in the response. That is, emergency
response involves diverse agencies in multiple sectors
(i.e., governmental or non-governmental sectors,
including the private—i.e., airlines, medical waste
treatment companies—or the non-profit sectors—i.e.,
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medical professional and academic associations).
Previous studies have noted that voluntary civil society
organizations also participate in the response, for
example, non-profit organizations in the local
community [23]. Considering the government’s public
responsiveness and major duty in emergency response,
however, it is reasonable to assume that governmental
actors are required to play a more important role during
the response, particularly in such public health
emergencies as infectious disease outbreaks.
H2: A governmental actor is more likely to establish
a connection with other actors than are nongovernmental actors.
The key stakeholders may change as the crisis type
varies [8]. For example, in a wildfire or hurricane crisis,
we may expect fire departments to play a leading role
because of their expertise in managing such disasters
[26]. In attacks people perpetrate, such as 9-11, the
police department is supposed to make a significant
contribution. It is reasonable to assume that health actors,
such as hospitals, medical research centers, and the
government’s health department, will play the leading
roles in response to an infectious disease outbreak.
Similarly, as the major duty of non-health actors, such
as fire departments, is saving lives and extinguishing
fires, they are less likely to be prioritized in a health
agency manual. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that health actors will be intended to be the first
responders in the case of infectious diseases, and to
establish connections with others than will non-health
actors.
H3: Health actors are more likely to establish
connections with other actors than are non-health actors.
The four crucial response activities in public health
emergencies are surveillance, patient management,
epidemiological investigation, and laboratory testing
[31]. Surveillance and patient management are related
to recognizing and reporting suspected cases to health
authorities promptly, as well as managing confirmed
cases and their close contacts [31]. Once a suspected or
confirmed case is reported, public health agencies
perform epidemiological investigation to identify the
disease’s cause and consequences at the locations where
the cases are identified, such as hospitals. Laboratory
testing is necessary to identify the pathogen that causes
the disease or diagnose suspected cases, which rely on
protective equipment and facilities. Therefore, we
assume that the activities related to requesting or
providing such medical equipment as screening tools
and protective equipment, and human resources, such as

epidemiologists and disease professionals, were most
likely to be included in the response manuals.
Homophily hypotheses can be used to examine such
transfer activities. The homophily effect refers to
reciprocal ties’ influence in predicting tie formation,
which can result from two mechanisms: 1) two agencies
that are assigned to conduct key activities, such as
exchanging medical and/or human resources, and 2) two
agencies that are not intended to conduct key activities,
but other activities instead. Because key activities are
more important in the epidemic response, we do not
expect that the second mechanism contributes to tie
formation. Thus, we focused on the first mechanism and
differentiated the homophily effect and proposed H4
and H5.
H4: Two agencies, both of which are intended to
transfer materials, are more likely to form a tie.
H5: Two agencies, both of which are intended to
transfer human resources, are more likely to form a tie.
When responding to a public health emergency,
stakeholders’ appropriate roles and responsibilities in all
phases must be assigned in advance [3]. As planners
acquire knowledge about the disease outbreak, they are
likely to revise the written plans to respond to the
changing situation. Regardless of the activities included
in response plans and the way they are specified, plans
in an action field have inherent limitations in their
ability to guide an emergency response, and their
usefulness has long been debated [5] [27] [30]. By
examining the actors, activities, and coordination plans
in the written documents, we can obtain a basic
understanding of what priorities the government set
during the emergency and which agencies were intended
to act in the critical and supportive tasks.

3. Data and methods
3.1. Data
KCDC prepared the first MERS-CoV response
manual in July 2014 and revised it eight times before the
epidemic ended on December 23, 2015 [21] [22]. The
manual’s nine versions were obtained when they
became available online on the Korean government’s
MERS-CoV website. The stages’ division of the
epidemic is based on the way the Korean government
distinguished the epidemic’s progress. Table 1 below
shows the MERS-CoV epidemic’s stages and the month
each version was published.
Table 1. Response manual version list
Stage
Versions
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Before
(before May 20,
2015)

•
•

Early
(May 20, 2015–
June 8, 2015)

•
•

ver. 3-1: May 2015
ver. 3-2: June 2015

Peak
(June 9, 2015–
July 27, 2015)

•
•
•

ver. 3-3: June 2015
ver. 3-3-1: June 2015
ver. 3-3-2: June 2015

Waning
(July 28, 2015–
December 23,
2015)

•
•

ver. 3-4: July 2015
ver. 3-5: August 2015

ver. 1: July 2014
ver. 2: December 2014

The author of the paper and a graduate student, both
of whom are fluent in Korean, analyzed the response
manuals’ content and collected the planned coordination
networks among the key actors in the manuals.

3.2. Response coordination networks
The response manuals were designed to direct
coordinated
efforts
among
key
stakeholder
organizations in the four critical tasks during the disease
outbreak⎯reporting suspected cases, laboratory testing,
epidemiological investigation, and patient management
[20] [21] [22]. These tasks involve transferring
information, specimens, equipment, human resources,
or patients between organizations because different
organizations possess different resources, skills, and
knowledge. The manual also listed other supporting
activities in addition to the four critical tasks, and most
of the critical and supportive tasks were required to be
performed through direct or indirect coordinated actions
with other organizations.
The manual defined actors in two different ways:
individual organizations and collectives (groups of
organizations; i.e., local fire stations) because the
location of an outbreak is uncertain until it actually
occurs. Central government departments are easy to
identify, but organizations at the local level or in other
sectors (e.g., airlines) are difficult to list in the response
manual. To be consistent with actors in our analysis, we
use groups of organizations (i.e., collectives) as network
actors. To do so, individual organizations and groups of
organizations were grouped based on their scope of
service
(national,
provincial,
or
local),
function/specialty (e.g., police, fire, health), as well as
whether they are governmental or non-governmental
organizations. We were able to identify 16 planned
actors. Table 2 summarizes the list of actors in the
manual.

ID
A(HA)
A(MP)
C(MW)
C(TP)
H
HD
LFS
LG
LHC
LPS
LQS
NHD
NPE(TP)
NSD
PG
PHR

Table 2. Actor list
Actors
Academic Associations (Medical)
Professional Associations (Medical)
Medical Waste Treatment Companies
Airlines or Ships
Hospitals
Designated Hospitals
Local Fire Stations
Local Governments
Local Health Clinics
Local Police Stations
Local Quarantine Stations
National Health Departments
National Public Enterprises
Other Central Government Departments
Provincial Governments
Provincial Health and Environmental
Research Institutes

Note that in Table 2, IDs with an H refer to health
actors, while those without an H are non-health actors.
IDs with an N refer to national level actors, those with a
P to provincial level actors, and those with an L to local
level actors. In addition, A(HA) and A(MP) are national,
non-governmental, and health related, while C(MW)
and C(TP) are national, non-governmental, and nonhealth-related actors.

3.3. Exponential random graph models
Exponential random graph models (ERGMs) are tiebased statistical models used to understand social
structures. ERGMs are based on the idea that a larger
network can be analyzed by studying the presence of
smaller network configurations [25]. The network
configurations (or smaller constituent parts) provide
mathematical explanations for the way the ties might be
present in a network [25]. For example, the homophily
configuration is a local structure in which two actors
with the same attributes (e.g., conduct the same task)
tend to form a reciprocal tie. ERGMs give each
configuration a parameter estimate and a standard error,
whereby we may: 1) infer whether each parameter
increases or decreases the likelihood of tie formation in
the network by looking at the sign of the estimate
(positive or negative), and 2) assess the results’
statistical significance by comparing the difference in
the absolute value of the standard error and estimate.
ERGMs equation describes the probability
distribution for a graph with n nodes and l
configurations, which can be written as follows:
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𝑃𝑟(𝑋 = 𝑥|𝜃) ≡

1
𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝜃1 𝑧1 (𝑥) + 𝜃2 𝑧2 (𝑥) + ⋯
𝑘(𝜃)
+ 𝜃𝑙 𝑧𝑙 (𝑥)}

in which 𝑃𝑟(𝑋 = 𝑥|𝜃) is the probability distribution of
the network given all of the smaller configurations
1
described in the equation; 𝑘(𝜃) is the normalizing
constant that ensures the sum of the probability remains
within 0 to 1; 𝜃𝑙 is the coefficient of the network
statistics of interest, and 𝑧𝑘 (𝑥) is the counts of
configurations that include statistics 𝑘 .
We included four configurations related to our
hypotheses. For the actor/node-level, we focused on
three attributes: the scope of service, government level,
and specialty. The scope of service refers to the level
(i.e., local, provincial, or national) that an agency can
control or influence, with which we can examine the
way an actor’s scope of service influences the likelihood
of forming a tie. The government refers to the sector to
which an actor belongs. Whether the actor is a
government agency will affect the probability that it
forms a tie with another actor. Specialty refers to an
actor’s major responsibility or function in the response.
Dyad-level predictors were used when we
hypothesized that a particular characteristic in a dyad
affects the probability of observing a tie in the network.
For this study, the dyadic attributes are the same
activities two actors perform (e.g., both are planned to
report a suspected case or send a specimen). We
supposed that coordination activities of transferring
human resources and/or materials contribute
substantially to the network density. Table 3 presents the
variables and values assigned to the attributes.

Level
Node-level

Dyad-level

Table 3. Variables
Predictors
Values
Scope
0 Local
1 Provincial
2 National
Government
0 Non-government
1 Government
Specialty
0 Non-health
1 Health
Transferring
0 No
material
1Yes
Transferring
0 No
people
1 Yes

For each stage in the network, we began by building
a null model with the same number of edges and nodes
as the planned response network. The null models were
used as a baseline to judge the degree to which
subsequent models improved. The probability of
observing a tie in the estimated networks can be

calculated by taking the logistic transformation of the
edge parameters added in the subsequent models.
Once the null models were obtained, the simulated
models were built by adding node- and dyadic-level
predictors to the null models. In particular, dyadic
attributes allowed us to test the homophily hypotheses
(H4 and H5). We compared these models based on
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Goodness of
Fit (GoF) values and chose the best fit models to
interpret the importance of the configurations of interest.

4. Results
4.1. Network characteristics
Table 4 presents the planned response network’s
characteristics during the epidemic’s different stages
observed from the response manuals. Of 16 actors, 15
were planned to coordinate in the manual before the
outbreak. The number of connected actors reduced in
the subsequent response manuals, such that 13 were
found to be connected in the waning stage of the crisis.
Each network was fairly dense, and the density
increased over stages, which led to the interesting result
that as the number of connected actors and the total
connections decreased, the network density increased.
The average clustering coefficients were between 0.44
and 0.50, indicating that there were some clustering
effects in each network.
Table 4. Network measures
Before Early Peak Waning
(s0)
(s1)
(s2)
(s3)
Nodes
15
15
14
13
Ties
110
118
135
111
Avg. degree
2.67
2.87
3.50
3.08
Density
0.52
0.56
0.73
0.71
Avg. clustering
0.45
0.44
0.5
0.5
coefficient (cc)
Figure 1 includes the networks designed before (s0)
and during the peak (s2) of the outbreak for illustration
purposes. Before the outbreak, the planners conceived
that local actors, such as LHC and LQS together with
NHD, would be at the center of the response
coordination network (Figure 1(a)). However, as the
planners acquired more knowledge of the crisis and the
crisis became more severe, LHC remained at the center,
but NHD and PG’s roles appeared to be enhanced. NHD,
PG, and LHC’s positions became more apparent at the
peak in Figure 1(b). With some changes, the structure
and central actors remained somewhat consistent over
time.
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the descriptive results of the actors’ number and
networks’ density in 4.1.

C(TP)

LFS

Table 5. Null models

NPE(TP)

NSD

LQS

Estimates
(SE)
AIC
Logit

LHC
PHR
PG

LG

HD

NHD

*** p<0.01

H
C(MW)

Before
(s0)
-1.45
(0.18)***
206.5
0.19
** p<0.05

Early
(s1)
-1.39
(0.17)***
212.2
0.2

Peak
(s2)
-1.08
(0.17)***
207.8
0.25

Waning
(s3)
-1.10
(0.18)***
177.4
0.25

* p<0.1

A(MP)

Table 6. Predicting tie formation

A(HA)

Estimates
(SE)

(a) Planned before the outbreak (s0)

Scope
Provincial

C(MW)

National
H
HD

Govt.
LFS
PHR

PG

NHD

Health

LHC

Material
Material0

LQS

C(TP)

NSD

LG
LPS

Material1
NPE(TP)

(b) Changed at the peak (s2)

People
People0
People1

Figure 1. Response networks

4.2. Coordination networks during different
stages
4.2.1. Overall examination of all stages. In Table 6, we
examined our hypothesized model by adding node- and
dyad-level attributes to the null model (Table 5). The
results showed several interesting points. First, the AIC
values of the estimated model during each stage
decreased considerably compared to the null model,
indicating the selected parameters used in our model
explained the data during each stage better. Second,
given that the parameters’ logit transformation was
calculated to give the networks’ density overall, the
Logit values during s1-s3 increased greatly compared to
the null model, except for s0. This result indicated that
before the outbreak, the planners were less informed of
the crisis’ nature, and which types of actors or activities
to include in the response manual, which resonated with

AIC
Logit
*** p<0.01

Before
(s0)
-2.85
(1.03)***

Early
(s1)
-4.03
(1.06)***

Peak
(s2)
-4.13
(0.92)***

Waning
(s3)
-5.33
(1.42)***

0.10
(0.62)
0.12
(0.42)
-0.12
(0.58)
0.81
(0.41)**

-1.21
(0.52)**
-0.64
(0.36)*
1.53
(0.44)***
0.75
(0.51)

-1.68
(0.62)***
-1.12
(0.48)**
1.60
(0.49)***
0.44
(0.49)

-1.12
(0.54)**
-0.56
(0.42)
1.12
(0.50)**
2.42
(1.20)**

-2.38
(0.89)***
1.78
(0.60)***

-0.10
(0.64)
1.80
(0.62)***

0.16
(0.80)
2.78
(0.74)***

2.08
(1.32)
0.39
(1.23)

-2.45
(1.16)**
2.97
(0.72)***
134.5
0.12
** p<0.05

0.37
(0.56)
1.22
(0.54)**
172.7
0.42
* p<0.1

0.22
(0.55)
1.42
(0.53)***
163.9
0.42

0.84
(0.60)
1.37
(0.56)**
147.3
0.77

In Table 6, the most striking difference was observed
in the comparison between s0 (Before) and s1, s2, and
s3 (during the outbreak). We interpret the results in
depth below.
4.2.2. Before the outbreak (s0). Two node-level
attributes, scope and government, did not contribute
significantly to the network density during s0. Planners
did not pay significant attention to the scope of actors’
service, and to which sector they belonged when making
plans before the crisis. However, health is statistically
significant, indicating that planners focused on
assigning health-related actors to coordinate in the
network. Further, the results indicated that the
homophily effects on material and people were mixed.
The homophily effects were contributed by two actors,

Page 599

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

4.2.5. Goodness-of-fit. The goodness-of-fit (GOF) test
was performed to ensure that there were no major
problems with the convergence [24]. A model fits well
when a simulated network is as extreme as the network
observed. Our models across the four stages all
demonstrated a good fit, with most p-values in the GOF
test above 0.5 and close to 1. This simple model with
eight parameters captured the structural patterns in the
planned networks during each stage well. In Figure 2,
we presented the diagnostic plots during s0 and s2 with
95% confidence intervals for illustration purposes. They
show that our models fit well with the observed network
because there was little variation in each network’s
statistics across the simulated network.

Simulated quantiles

4.2.4. Summary of findings. Each of the parameters in
Table 6 represents different configurations. An overall
comparison of the parameters during each stage
revealed some differences. First, the estimates of scope
and government were significant during s1, s2, and s3,
indicating that local and governmental agencies were
planned to play important roles in coordination during
the outbreak; thus, H1 and H2 were supported in part.
Second, the health specialty was associated positively
with the probability of tie formation during the Before
and Waning stages, but had little influence during the
Early and Peak stages, indicating that as the outbreak

H1
H2
H3
H4
H5

Table 7. ERGM results (summary)
Before
Early
Peak
Waning
(s0)
(s1)
(s2)
(s3)
Reject
Accept
Reject
Accept
Accept
Reject
Accept
Reject
Accept
Reject
Accept

0.2

4.2.3. During the outbreak (s1-s3). The estimates of
the scope of service on the provincial and national levels
were negative and significant from s1 to s3, suggesting
that national and provincial actors reduced the
probability of tie formation significantly compared to
local actors. Thus, planners envisioned that assigning
tasks to local actors was more likely to enhance tight
coordination. Further, government was associated
positively and significantly with the probability of tie
formation during these stages, indicating that planners
began to rely on governmental actors to increase
coordination. The estimate of health actors predicted tie
formation positively and significantly during s0, but not
significant during s1 and s2. The probability that health
and non-health actors would form ties did not differ
statistically significantly in the early and peak stages,
while in the waning stage, health-related actors were
planned again to coordinate with other actors, as during
s0. Unlike during s0, the positive and significant results
for two dyadic variables during the outbreak (s1-s3)
indicated that two agencies who are both planned to
transfer material and human resources had strong
homophily effects on predicting the tie formation. In
other words, two actors, both of which were planned to
exchange materials, contributed to the homophily effect.
Two actors that were not planned to be involved in those
key activities did not contribute to the tie formation in
the network.

became severe, the Korean government decided to rely
on more supportive agencies to isolate suspected and
confirmed cases; thus, H3 was supported in part. Third,
the results that two actors, both of which were planned
to transfer physical and/or human resources, were more
likely to increase the network density during s1-s3
shows that planners realized the importance of assigning
actors to perform key activities during the outbreak.
However, before the outbreak, two actors, neither of
which was planned to transfer physical and/or human
resources, also contributed to the homophily effect,
indicating that the planners did not consider the key
activities particularly critical to the response. Thus, H4
and H5 were supported in part. Table 7 presents a
summary of the results.

0.0

both of which were planned, or neither was planned to
transfer material and human resources. These two
mechanisms of the homophily effect had different
influences on the outcome. The reciprocal relationship
between actors that were planned neither to transfer
material and/or people decreased the probability of
observing a tie in the network significantly. In other
words, conducting the supportive activities other than
transferring material and/or people decreased the
probability of tie formation. In contrast, the two actors,
both of which were planned to be involved in
transferring materials and/or people, increased the
likelihood of observing a tie in the network significantly.

Edges

Provincial

National

Government

Health

Material.0

Material.1

People.0

People.1

Model statistics
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Model Fit Before the Outbreak (s0)

0.6
0.4
0.0

0.2

Simulated quantiles

0.8

1.0

a.

Edges

Provincial

National

Government Health

Material.0

Material.1

People.0

People.1

Model statistics

b.

Model Fit During the Peak (s2)

Figure 2. Diagnostic plots

5. Discussion
One step in developing more solid theoretical
accounts of response plans for an emergency is to
examine what constitutes a useful and realistic plan. In
this study, the network arrangements that can affect tie
formation between actors were drawn from actor- and
dyad-level attributes in the MERS response manuals in
South Korea before and during the outbreak. We
hypothesized that the probability of tie formation is a
function of agencies’ scope of service, sector
(governmental vs. non-governmental), specialty (health
vs. non-health related agency), and the actor’s match in
activities related to key activities, i.e., transferring
material and/or personnel resources.
After examining the network data with ERGM
analysis, we found: 1) compared to the response plan
prepared before the outbreak, some adjustments were
made to enhance the connections between local and
governmental actors. While Table 4 shows that the
networks became denser over time, Table 6 suggests
that the increasing density derived from those local and
governmental actors; 2) Health actors’ role was unclear
during the Early and Peak stages, suggesting that as the
outbreak became severe, planners began to emphasize
the role of non-health actors, and sought the support
from police and fire departments to isolate people
suspected to be infected, and 3) The differential
homophily effect with respect to the exchange of
materials and human resources was observed
consistently over time, and proved to be associated
positively and significantly with the likelihood of tie
formation during all stages. This result also suggested
that actors that were planned to transfer human

resources, including experts, doctors, nurses and other
professionals, were more likely to establish connections
with others.
The difference in the response coordination plans
between before (s0) and during (s1-s3) the outbreak is
worth noting here. Such a discrepancy showed that
planners had little idea of the way to plan for an
unknown emergency until they experienced it. Their
lack of operational experience in planning can be
explained from two perspectives. First, before the
outbreak, they had little experience on what type of
actors and activities to include in the manuals. Therefore,
they selected to involve as many actors as possible to
eliminate the potential threats to a large extent,
regardless of the actors’ characteristics. For example,
hospitals may play the major role in the response
network by treating the patients effectively. It also is
likely that non-health actors will play the leading role in
identifying and isolating confirmed cases to reduce the
infection rate. Second, there was discordance between
the planners’ perceived threats and the activities that
needed to be involved before the outbreak. As the results
during s0 show, the homophily effect that resulted from
transferring material or personnel was attributable
simultaneously to two types of actors, one of which was
assigned the key activities, while the other was assigned
other supportive tasks. Unfortunately, the probability of
forming a tie was decreased by the two agencies that
were planned to conduct supportive activities, which are
irrelevant to key activities like transferring material
and/or personnel.
This article provided evidence for the constant
revisions in response plans during different epidemic
stages. During the revision process, the Korean
government chose to continue to involve only key actors
rather than including more actors in the response manual.
In addition, the government chose to increase the
connection among the key actors over time. This
tendency to keep core actors in the response plan is
consistent with others’ observation [28]. In our study,
the core actors were composed of those that are local,
governmental, and health-related. One drawback of the
decision is that the response manual continues to ignore
international actors (or perhaps other actors) that were
critical in responding to the disease effectively.
We used a small network dataset that consists of 16
core actors that were supposed to prepare for and
respond to the epidemic event. At least, we observed
certain changes to adapt to the evolving situation by
increasing the effort to build connections with other
actors on the part of such core actors as local,
governmental, and health actors. We cannot judge
whether the adjustment was sufficient only by looking
at the planned response data. Given the wide recognition
that the MERS response was a failed case, the
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insufficiency in the revisions needs to be examined
thoroughly elsewhere. Moreover, emergency response
is managed not only by the core actors, but also by
emergent actors, which can change the response
network’s structure, stability, and effectiveness. Our
next study will examine the way this planned
coordination actually unfolded in the response process,
to determine whether the changes the planners made
during each stage were meaningful to the actual
responders.

6. Conclusion
Societies are unlikely to know in advance when and
what type of crisis will occur. However, it is necessary
to formulate a plan that assumes such an event will
occur, and to ask stakeholders to act on that plan if the
presumed event does occur. On the other hand,
following the plan as it is designed may not always bring
positive or intended results because of unforeseen
contingencies. The emergency management literature
has recognized well that formal policies and plans are
limited inherently in responding to disruptive events [2]
[3] [29]. Nonetheless, the gaps between planned and
implemented networks may not be identified easily
unless the response plans are scrutinized and analyzed
thoroughly. This study fills a gap in the emergency
management literature by examining the design features
and changes in coordination plans among key actors in
South Korea’s MERS response manual.
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